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Introduction	European	anti-austerity	and	pro-democracy	movements	form	part	of	a	global	wave	of	protests	following	the	global	financial	crisis.	Waves	(or	“cycles	of	contention”)	are	characterized	by	a	rapid	diffusion	of	collective	action,	innovation	in	forms	of	contention,	shared	new	major	frames	of	meaning,	discourse	and	action,	the	incorporation	of	new	unorganized	actors	with	organized	actors,	and	increased	contention	between	challengers	and	authorities	(Tarrow,	1998).	Waves	follow	periods	of	expansion	(across	social	groups,	sectors,	policy	areas,	and	sometimes	borders),	transformation	(of	strategies,	alliance	structures,	identities)	and	finally,	contraction	or	subsidence	(Koopmans,	2004).		In	the	heady	early	days	of	protests	and	occupations	observers,	pundits	and	scholars	were	quick	to	offer	theories	to	explain	what	was	happening,	many	of	which	centered	around	claims	of	newness,	spontaneity,	and	the	unprecedented	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2015a).	Often	those	narratives	were	infused	with	excitement	and	optimism	for	progressive	social	change	fuelled	by	early	victories	in	Iceland,	Egypt	and	Tunisia.	This	widespread	feeling	of	excitement	and	possibility	has	been	observed	in	previous	waves	of	intense	mobilization,	described	as	“moments	of	madness”	(Zolberg	1972)	or	
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the	“eros	effect”	(Katsiaficas	1989).	Once	waves	enter	into	subsidence	(at	least	in	some	places)	or	suffer	reversals	of	early	victories,	we	are	able	to	better	evaluate	some	of	the	early	explanations	in	light	of	their	diverse	trajectories	and	outcomes.			In	this	article,	I	will	analyze	the	key	features	of	this	European	wave	of	mobilizations,	drawing	on	the	extensive	existing	literature	and	insights	from	my	own	research	on	anti-austerity	mobilization	in	Spain	and	Irelandi,	and	focusing	primarily,	but	not	exclusively,	on	Southern	Europe	and	the	movements	of	the	squares.	I	proceed	in	five	parts.	In	section	one,	I	argue	that	although	the	economic	crisis	and	attendant	increases	in	social-economic	inequalities	and	hardship	provide	a	crucial	motivating	factor	for	protests	against	austerity,	they	are	insufficient	to	explain	mobilization	-	a	fact	borne	out	by	the	strong	differences	in	collective	responses	to	austerity	in	those	countries	hardest	hit.	I	argue	that	the	financial	crisis	and	austerity	policies	brought	into	sharp	relief	the	longer-term	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	representative	democracy	in	Europe	(Armingeon	and	Guthman,	2014;	della	Porta,	2012a,	2012b,	2013,	2015;	Flesher	Fominaya,	2014a,	2015a,	2015b;	Langman,	2013;	Norris,	2011).		To	the	extent	that	these	“twin”	crises	are	framed	synergistically,	they	can	be	seen	as	counter-hegemonic,	as	they	seek	not	only	to	contest	specific	austerity	policies	but	to	rupture	the	(post-political)	consensus	around	the	neoliberal	order	underpinning	the	(neo)liberal	state	and	representative	democracy.	In	this	sense,	as	I	argue	in	section	two,	they	represent	a	continuation	of	the	double	critique	levelled	by	the	Global	Justice	Movement	(henceforth	GJM)	against	neoliberal	
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capitalist	globalization	and	illegitimate,	ineffective	representative	democracy	but	now	framed	within	the	aftermath	of	the	global	financial	crisis	and	austerity	policies.	As	these	material	effects	hit,	the	critique	of	the	democratic	deficit	shifts	from	the	supranational	targets	most	visible	in	the	GJM	to	centre	on	nation-state	oligarchies,	and	protester	collective	identity	is	constructed	around	the	political	subject	“citizen”	and	“the	people”.		As	the	nation-state	returns	centre	stage	as	target	and	focus	of	protest,	democracy	emerges	as	a	central	demand,	as	I	show	in	section	three.	Here	the	critical	connection	between	these	intertwined	crises	(economic/financial	and	political)	finds	its	clearest	and	most	emblematic	expression	in	the	occupy-style	“movement	of	the	squares”,	whose	consequences	resonate	far	beyond	the	squares	to	influence	mobilization	across	organizational	forms	and	sectors.		However,	as	I	show	in	section	four,	their	transnational	resonance	in	uneven,	and	does	not	follow	a	linear	progression.	As	I	show	in	section	five,	focusing	on	the	Spanish	case,	as	activists	and	citizens	contest	austerity	and	question	the	legitimacy	of	political	elites	to	represent	them,	the	state	responds	through	legal	restrictions.	In	the	face	of	the	intransigence	of	national	political	and	economic	oligarchies,	and	the	recognition	of	the	limited	impact	of	protest	on	changes	in	austerity	policy	or	democratic	renewal,	some	mobilization	becomes	institutionalized	in	the	form	of	new	hybrid	parties,	such	as	Podemos	and	the	municipal	movements.		Finally,	I	argue	that	understanding	the	deeply	political	nature	of	these	protests	means	recognizing	the	most	significant	potential	they	offer	for	socio-political	transformation:	austerity	is	still	in	place	across	Europe,	but	new	initiatives	attempting	to	transform	“really	existing	democracy”	have	emerged.		
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I.	Twin	crises:	financial	crisis	and	the	legitimation	crisis	
of	representative	democracy	During	this	wave	of	European	anti-austerity	mobilization,	long-established	political	opposition	cultures	are	being	remobilized,	but	within	a	much	changed	political	and	economic	context	that	has	provided	increased	political	opportunities	for	mobilization	facilitated	by	the	after-effects	of	the	global	financial	crisis.		In	those	countries	most	affected,	the	decrease	in	material	conditions	due	to	the	impact	of	the	crisis	(e.g.	rising	unemployment	and	collapse	of	housing	markets)	have	combined	with	austerity	policies	that	have,	inter	alia,	drastically	cut	welfare	state	measures	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	these	consequences	on	citizens.	This	context	has	made	possible	a	greater	receptivity	of	the	public	towards	the	anti-neoliberal	capitalist	critique	and	the	calls	for	greater	democracy	and	socio-economic	justice,	particularly	in	those	contexts	where	people	experience	strong	effects	of	the	crisis.	It	has	also	resulted	in	scholars	calling	for	greater	attention	to	the	material	bases	of	mobilization,	or	political	economic	opportunity	structures	(see	Císař	and	Navrátil,	this	issue).	However,	a	potential	receptivity	does	not	automatically	translate	into	mass	mobilizations:	a	network	of	actors	willing	and	able	to	channel	and	mobilize	those	grievances	is	needed	(Koopmans,	2004,	p.	22).	The	countries	most	affected	by	the	global	crisis	and	the	Troika’s	demands	for	economic	adjustments		(pejoratively	denominated	PIIGS)	had	strongly	different	mobilization	responses:	Spain	and	Greece	having	strong	and	sustained	mobilizations,	Italy,	Ireland	and	Portugal	relatively	moderate	ones	(see	Baumgarten;	Kannellopoulos	et.	al.;	and	Zamponi	and	Fernández;	all	this	issue).		Untangling	the	many	
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factors	that	can	explain	these	differences	is	an	important	task	for	scholarship,	that	requires	a	nuanced	exploration	of	the	relationship	between	different	political-economic	configurations	and	patterns	of	protest	(see	e.g.	Císař	and	Navrátil,	this	issue;	della	Porta,	2015).			As	important	as	the	global	economic	crisis	(and	the	related	Eurozone	crisis)	is,	if	we	want	to	understand	this	European	wave	of	contention,	we	must	also	recognize	the	central	importance	is	the	legitimation	crisis	of	democracy	(Habermas,	1975).	Economic/financial	crises	provoke	legitimation	crises	when	elites	are	perceived	as	having	caused	and	benefitted	from	them,	and	having	failed	to	protect	citizens	against	their	worst	effects	(Della	Porta	2012a	and	b,	2015;	Flesher	Fominaya	2015b;	Langman,	2013).	The	financial	crisis	brought	to	a	head	a	longer-term	decline	in	trust,	legitimacy,	and	satisfaction	with	democratic	regimes,	fuelled	by	an	increase	in	demands	for	democracy	(rising	public	aspirations	for	democracy),	an	increase	in	negative	news	about	government,	and	an	analysis	of	the	actual	performance	and	structure	of	existing	democratic	regimes	(Norris	2011).	There	has	been	a	dramatic	increase	in	dissatisfaction	with	democracy	in	Europe	since	the	2007/2008	global	financial	crisis	due	to	a	combination	of	citizen	perception	of	loss	of	national	sovereignty	and	economic	deterioration	(Armingeon	and	Guthman,	2014).	Economic	crises	and	austerity	policies	reflect	and	contribute	to	the	crisis	of	representative	democracy	(della	Porta,	2012a,	2015;	Flesher	Fominaya	2015b)	in	which	the	recent	waves	of	movements	of	the	squares	“are	just	the	most	visible”	manifestation	(Della	Porta	2012a,	p.33).	Political-economic	legitimation	crises	also	transform	interpretive	frameworks	of	meaning,	“as	people	withdraw	
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commitment	to	the	social	order	–creating	spaces	for	alternative	views	and	understandings”(Langman,	2013,	p.	159).				Countering	the	effects	of	decline	in	legitimacy	of	representative	democracy	are	the	mechanisms	that	reproduce	what	Badiou	(2005),	Mouffe	(2005),	Rancière	(2004)	and	Žižek	(2000)	have	referred	to	as	the	“post-political”.	In	the	post-political	sphere,	representative	democracy	is	closely	tied	to	liberal	economy,	and	is	mobilized	as	a	means	of	restricting	or	foreclosing	public	debate	about	the	social	and	economic	order.	“Politics”	is	reduced	to	a	form	of	social	administration,	organized	around	consensus	about	neoliberalism	and	the	liberal	state.	Did	the	economic	crisis	and	austerity	policies	then	produce	a	rupture	in	the	post-political	consensus?	Although	mobilization	is	partly	a	response	to	the	crisis,	grievances	on	their	own	will	not	lead	to	mobilization	(Langman,	2013;	Oliver,	1989).	What	then	causes	discontent	levels	to	change	significantly?	And	how	was	this	discontent	framed	by	collective	actors	in	the	European	wave	of	mobilization?		In	European	countries	affected	by	the	crisis	and	austerity	policies,	mass	mobilizations	against	austerity	were	driven	by	two	main	sets	of	actors:	institutional	left	(e.g.	unions,	smaller	parties)	and	more	autonomous	“subterranean”	actors.	The	cleavage	between	these	actors,	each	of	whom	has	a	distinct	logic	of	collective	action,	is	a	significant	feature	of	the	European	social	movement	landscape	(Flesher	Fominaya	2007,	2014a;	see	also	Císař	and	Navrátil,	this	issue;	and	Kannellopoulos	et.al,	this	issue).	However,	in	keeping	with	
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other	periods	of	intense	mobilization,	alliances	across	different	actors	were	also	forged	(Koopmans,	2004;	Tarrow,	1998).			Institutional	actors	played	a	crucial	role	in	some	countries,	such	as	Portugal,	where	unions	initiated	protest	more	effectively	than	“newer”	more	autonomous	types	of	actors	(Accornero	and	Pinto,	2015).	Trade	unions	have	also	played	a	key	role	in	other	national	mobilizations	(see	Accornero	and	Pinto,	2015,	for	Portugal;	Balbona	and	Begega,	2016,	for	Spain;	Císař	and	Navrátil	,	this	issue,	for	the	Czech	Republic;	della	Porta	et.al.,	2012,	for	Italy;	Kannellopoulos	et.	al,	this	issue,	for	Greece).	These	forms	of	protest	contributed	to	the	erosion	of	legitimacy	of	the	specific	governments	in	power	at	the	time,	and	indeed	governments	that	oversaw	austerity	policies	and	labour	reforms	paid	the	price	at	elections	(see	Hayes,	this	issue).		
	The	autonomous	actors	were	those	involved	primarily	driving	the	movements	of	the	squares	and	related	initiatives,	who	in	the	wake	of	the	financial	crisis	and	the	devastation	wrought	by	austerity	policies,	attempted	to	translate	the	decline	in	trust,	satisfaction	and	legitimacy	of	representative	democracy	into	a	legitimation	crisis,	and	to	break	the	restrictions	and	apathy	of	the	post-political.		In	the	face	of	a	crisis	of	political	representation,	these	activists/citizens	did	not	ask	for	less	politics,	but	more	politics.	These	autonomous	activists	broadened	the	resistance	to	austerity	into	a	debate	about	the	nature	and	meaning	of	democracy.	Activists	in	Spain,	Greece	and	in	other	squares	demanded	a	reclaiming	of	democracy	and	its	institutions,	they	appealed	to	the	rights	enshrined	in	the	constitution,	to	national	sovereignty	and	
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governments	that	respond	to	citizen	needs	(Benski	et.al,	2013;	Flesher	Fominaya,	2014a,	2015a;	Gerbaudo,	this	issue;	Oikonomakis	and	Roos,	2016).		This	is	what	Spanish	activists	meant	by	the	slogan	“we	are	not	anti-system,	the	system	is	anti-us”.	And	this	is	why	the	term	anti-politics,	sometimes	applied	to	these	mobilizations,	is	spectacularly	misleading.	In	European	countries	affected	by	the	crisis,	when	activists	manage	to	frame	the	democratic	deficit	as	responsible	for	the	crisis	and	its	effects,	this	intertwining	of	these	crises	provide	a	powerful	impetus	for	mobilization.	(della	Porta,	2012b,	2015;	Flesher	Fominaya	2014a,	2015a	and	b;	Shihade,	Flesher	Fominaya	and	Cox,	2012).			Research	shows	that	activists	across	Europe	perceived	the	crisis	as	a	political	crisis,	not	just	an	austerity	crisis,	and	that	their	mobilizations	despite	not	necessarily	being	larger	or	more	connected	to	each	other	than	those	during	the	GJM,	managed	to	have	greater	resonance	in	mainstream	public	opinion	(Kaldor	and	Selchow,	2013).	Contesting	“really	existing	democracy”	has	also	produced	more	visible	results	than	resisting	austerity.	Although	austerity	policies	are	still	in	place	across	Europe,	the	demands	for	real	democracy	have	paradoxically	delegitimized	representative	democracy	but	also	re-legitimized	it	through	the	attempts	to	reclaim	democratic	institutions	for	the	citizens.	I	am	arguing	then,	for	the	fruitfulness	of	adopting	a	lens	that	sees	these	post-2008	European	mobilizations	not	only	as		“anti-austerity”	movements	but	crucially	as	pro-democracy	
movements	(Flesher	Fominaya	2014a,	2015a).	Without	the	global	financial	crisis,	the	general	decline	in	trust	and	satisfaction	with	democracy	(a	long	term	trend	in	Europe	in	any	event)	would	not	
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have	been	effectively	channelled	by	core	activists	into	counter-hegemonic	narratives	about	the	crises	(financial	and	democratic).	The	presence	or	absence	of	a	strong	pro-democracy	narrative	that	connects	actors	across	sectorial	and	organizational	differences,	could	help	explain	why	we	find	anti-austerity	mobilization	even	in	places	where	there	was	little	austerity	(Germany)	and	conversely	its	weak	presence	where	there	was	“strong”	austerity	(Ireland).			Translating	grievances	into	collective	resistance	requires	activating	networks	of	actors	willing	and	able	to	make	effective	use	of	the	political	and	economic	opportunities	opened	up	by	these	“twin”	crises.	Here	the	interplay	between	the	particular	strength	and	density	of	local	and	national	activist	networks	(and	their	human,	material,	cultural	and	ideological	resources)	and	public	perceptions	of	the	crises	and	who	is	responsible	for	them	is	important.	Public	perception	is	itself	partly	affected	by	the	mobilizations	of	critical	social	movements	(e.g.	disclosing	and	disseminating	corruption	scandals	and	counterhegemonic	narratives	or	slogans	such	as	crisis/swindle),	but	also	countered	by	viewpoints	disseminated	by	mass	media	that	support	dominant	narratives,	(e.g.	austerity	is	inevitable,	banks	are	too	big	too	fail,	and	so	on).	At	the	same	time,	
transnational	diffusion	processes	also	significantly	influence	and	contribute	to	mobilization	processes	(and	here	national	and	transnational	activist/critical	citizen	networks	played	a	key	role	through	whistleblowing	and	critical	alternative	media,	and	the	influence	of	groups	such	as	Anonymous	and	Wikileaks).				
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Recognizing	the	synergistic	effects	of	these	crises	we	can	argue	that	these	mobilizations	can	be	seen	as	counter-hegemonic	when	they	seek	to	rupture	the	(“post-political”)	consensus	around	the	neoliberal	order	underpinning	state	and	representative	democracy.	Counter-hegemonic	mobilizations	encompass	not	just	a	critique	of	specific	policies	and	material	demands,	but	also	seek	to	expose	the	connections	between	the	political	(and	not	just	abstract	economic)	causes	of	the	crisis;	the	political	choices	made	in	adopting	austerity	policies	(which	despite	the	constraints	imposed	by	supranational	dictates,	are	still	choices,	and	not	an	inevitable	response	to	abstract	economic	considerations);	and	the	material	outcomes	of	those	austerity	policies.		The	penetration	and	resonance	of	counter-hegemonic	narratives	varied	across	specific	national	contexts,	but	their	replication	across	sites	arguably	created	a	multiplier	effect	that	at	the	very	least	opened	up	the	possibility	for	imagining	new	forms	of	democratic	engagement	and	alternatives	to	austerity.		
II.	From	the	Global	Justice	Movement	to	Anti-
Austerity/Pro-Democracy	Movements	Recognizing	the	importance	of	the	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	representative	democracy,	located	primarily	(but	not	exclusively)	within	the	framework	of	the	nation	state,	and	its	close	relation	to	the	financial	crisis,	also	helps	explain	the	most	significant	changes	and	continuities	from	the	previous	wave	of	protest,	the	GJM.		
Discontinuities:	From	the	transnational	to	the	national	and	from	anti-
neoliberalism	to	anti-austerity	In	both	the	GJM	and	the	wave	of	anti-austerity	mobilizations	in	
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Europe,	activists	were	contesting	the	global	socio-economic	order.	The	clearest	difference	between	the	GJM	and	the	current	wave	of	protests	in	Europe	is	the	effect	of	the	financial	crisis	and	austerity	measures	on	the	sites	and	target	of	activism.	If	during	the	GJM	activists	in	wealthy	countries	were	often	mobilizing	on	behalf	of	less	fortunate	others	often	“far	away”,	in	the	post-crisis	scenario	those	injustices	were	brought	home	and	made	visible,	whether	through	witnessing	increased	homelessness	and	neighbors	searching	through	the	garbage	for	food,	experiencing	unemployment	or	benefit	cuts,	visiting	food	banks	for	the	first	time,	or	reading	about	eviction-related	suicides.	People	were	no	longer	mobilizing	on	behalf	of	an	often	abstract	“other”	but	on	behalf	of	themselves,	their	families,	and	their	fellow	citizens.		The	most	notable	shift	in	targets	is	from	supranational	and	intergovernmental	institutions,	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF,	and	abstractii	targets	such	as	“global	capitalism”	during	the	GJM,	to	very	clear	and	specific	targets	at	the	national	level:	political	and	financial	oligarchies.	It	is	not	that	the	EU	and	the	Troika	are	not	also	blamed	for	the	crisis	and	austerity,	but	the	nation	state	is	much	more	central	as	a	stage	and	focus	of	collective	action	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2014a).		“Anti-neoliberalism”	(a	systemic	critique)	becomes	“anti-austerity”	(a	critique	of	specific	policies).	The	centrality	of	the	nation-state	is	manifest	in	collective	action	in	a	number	of	ways:	discursively,	tactically,	and	spatially.	Where	the	master	narratives	of	the	GJM	often	bypassed	the	state,	considering	it	to	be	an	actor	and	target	of	lesser	importance	than	supra	or	inter-national	actors,	in	the	current	wave,	activists	are	reclaiming	state	
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democracy,	appealing	to	their	respective	constitutional	guarantees,	and	bringing	narratives	about	“the	people”,	“the	nation”	(long	the	discursive	realm	of	the	“right”)	back	in	(see	also	Gerbaudo,	this	issue).	Protesters	in	countries	that	witnessed	strong	mobilizations,	such	as	Spain	and	Greece,	are	explicitly	making	visible	the	overlap	between	the	economic	and	political	classes,	laying	bare	the	neoliberal	nature	of	the	state	(Harvey,	2011)	and	refusing	to	accept	narratives	that	lay	the	responsibility	for	the	crisis	and	austerity	to	global	economic	processes	beyond	state	control.		Where	the	most	emblematic	and	visible	forms	of	GJM	activism	in	Europe	were	transnationally	organized	counter-summit	protests	and	International	and	European	Social	Forums	contesting	the	policies	of	transnational	or	multilateral	actors	(e.g.	EU	Presidency	meetings	and	international	summits),	the	majority	of	mobilizations	in	the	current	wave	took	place	in	the	centres	of	major	cities,	often	at	locations	emblematic	of	nation-	state	power	and	representation	(e.g.	parliament).	During	the	GJM	master	slogans	such	as	“Another	Europe	is	Possible”	called	for	an	alternative	EU/	imagined	Europe,	but	during	this	post/crisis	scenario	“Europe”	becomes	less	visible	(Kaldor	and	Selchow,	2013).	However,	there	were	significant	anti-Troika	mobilizations	in	a	number	of	countries,	including	the	“Fuck	the	Troika”	protests	in	Portugal	(15	September	2012,	2	March	2013),	numerous	general	strikes	and	mass	protests	directly	related	to	EU/Troika	actions	from	May	2010	to	present	in	Greece,	mass	protests	in	Romania	against	a	20	billion	euro	EU/IMF	rescue	package	and	austerity	measures	which	caused	the	government	to	resign	in	
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2012,	and	anti-austerity	protests	in	Ireland	(10	February	2013).	The	anti-Troika	protests	in	Greece	and	Portugal	were	nevertheless	embedded	in	narratives	and	symbols	appealing	to	shared	national	history	(Baumgarten,	this	issue;	Sergi	and	Vogiatzoglou,	2013).	The	reclaiming	of	the	state	forms	part	of	what	I	have	called	the	‘democratic	turn’	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2015a)	and	represents	a	key	departure	for	autonomous	activists	in	Europe,	traditionally	key	actors	in	articulating	a	rejection	of	global	capitalism,	who	shifted	master	narratives	from	a	refusal	to	engage	with	the	state	to	clear	demands	for	its	renewal	and	accountability	(Flesher	Fominaya	2010,	2015a).		This	shift	is	also	noted	by	Gerbaudo	(this	issue)	who	argues	that	“anti-austerity	movements	put	forward	an	anti-oligarchic	view	of	citizenship”,	and	in	so	doing	depart	from	the	“anti-statism	of	autonomous	movements.”	I	argue	that,	in	Spain	at	least,	autonomous	movements	themselves	have	evolved	to	embrace	and	re-appropriate	this	notion	of	citizenship,	which	reflects	longstanding	autonomous	desires	to	break	with	the	activist	ghetto	and	reach	out	to	“ordinary	citizens”,	but	not	without	important	tensions	(Flesher	Fominaya	2015a).	Císař	and	Navrátil	(this	issue)	also	note	this	shift	from	the	global/transnational	to	the	national	focus	of	protest	in	the	Czech	Republic.	The	shift	to	the	nation-state	also	explains	the	different	level	of	collective	identities	mobilized:	in	the	GJM	activists	in	diverse	sites	felt	part	of	a	global	movement,	in	this	global	wave	nationally	and	locally	rooted	movements	are	connected	loosely	transnationally,	but	do	not	form	a	transnational	global	movement	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2014a).			
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	Despite	earlier	research	(not	limited	to	the	GJM)	highlighting	a	low	degree	of	“Europeanization”	of	protest	overall	relative	to	domestic	targets	and	actors	(Imig	and	Tarrow,	2000),	this	shift	to	the	nation-state	is	somewhat	surprising.	Given	the	significant	role	of	the	Troika	in	the	bail-outs,	debt	renegotiations	and	austerity	policies	of	those	countries	hardest	hit,	we	might	expect	the	degree	of	Europeanization	of	protest	to	increase	in	the	wake	of	the	crisis.	Using	protest	claim	analysis	Bourne	and	Chatzopoulou	(2015)	show	that	in	fact	the	majority	of	protest	targets,	issues,	participants	and	identities	in	Greece	and	Spain	are	domestic.	Yet	despite	similar	levels	of	protest	over	a	similar	period,	there	is	significant	variation	between	the	two	cases.	Whereas	the	largest	number	of	events	were	characterized	as	non-Europeanized	(all	dimensions	measured	were	domestic),	“in	Greece	many	more	events	exhibited	at	least	one	dimension	of	Europeanization	(63%)	than	the	number	of	those	that	exhibited	no	Europeanization	at	all	(37%).	In	other	words,	Europeanization	is	significant	in	Greece,	but	not	in	Spain	(Bourne	and	Chatzopoulou,	2015:51).	Also	striking	is	that	targets	in	Greece	were	categorized	as	domestic,	European	and	transnational	simultaneously	28%	of	the	time,	whereas	in	Spain	this	was	the	case	only	2%	of	the	time.		Likewise	Pianta	and	Gerbaudo	(2015,	p.31)	find	both	anti-austerity	movements	and	institutional	actors	such	as	unions	focused	primarily	on	national	targets,	despite	the	fact	that	European	institutions	had	"a	pivotal	role	in	dictating	austerity	policies	on	the	continent."	There	is	a	lower	degree	of	transnational	coordination	between	the	two	waves	as	well	(Della	Porta,	2012b;	Kaldor	and	Selchow,	2013).	
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	This	shift	from	the	transnational	to	the	national	as	an	arena	of	struggle,	however,	does	not	describe	the	totality	of	mobilizations	during	this	wave.	Notable	exceptions	are	the	transnational	and	pan-European	initiatives,	“For	a	European	Spring”	(Corporate	Europe	Observatory,	2013),	Alter	Summit	(Alter	Summit	EU,	2013)	and	Blockupy	((Blockupy,	2016),	which	echo	the	organizational	forms	and	language	of	the	GJM,	but	now	with	a	specific	focus	on	austerity	and	a	greater	critique	of	the	loss	of	national	sovereignty.	This	more	institutional	left	orientation	is	also	reflected	in	the	important	role	trade	unions	play	in	these	trans-European	initiatives,	and	the	continuation	of	some	actors,	such	as	Attac.	Unions	also	mobilized	transnationally	in	the	historic	European	transnational	general	strike	action	(14th	November	2012)	under	the	slogan	“For	Jobs	and	Solidarity	in	Europe.	No	to	Austerity”,	which	resulted	in	general	strikes	in	Spain,	Portugal,	Greece,	Italy,	Cyprus,	Malta,	Slovenia	and	Lithuania,	and	general	strikes	and	sectorial	strikes	in	France	and	French	speaking	Belgium.			In	their	work	on	transnational	mobilization	and	critical	Europeanism,	Chatzopoulou	and	Bourne	(2016)	show	that	Alter-Summit,		Blockupy	and	the	European	Federation	of	Trade	Unions	all	share	a	common	interest	in	promotion	equality,	anti-austerity,	solidarity,	democracy	and	social	justice,	and	all	critique	the	democratic	deficits	of	the	EU.	As	transnational	social	movements	they	are	attempting	to	combat	the	“high	national	fragmentation	and	[...]	incapacity	to	construct	a	coordinated	campaign	at	the	continental	level,	commensurate	to	the	
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governance	structures	directing	austerity	policies	(Pianta	and	Gerbaudo,	2015).		In	European	anti-austerity	protests,	therefore,	albeit	to	different	degrees	across	cases,	we	see	a	linking	of	the	notion	of	ineffective,	insufficient	or	deficient	democracy	and	the	negative	effects	of	
neoliberal	global	capitalism.	The	financial	crisis	is	explicitly	linked	to	a	crisis	of	democracy,	and,	in	a	significant	shift	from	the	GJM	the	
political	responsibility	for	the	crisis	is	attributed	not	just	to	international	or	supranational	organizations	(such	as	the	ECB,	the	IMF	or	the	EU	Commission),	but	to	national	political	governments.	Additionally	appeals	to	the	notion	of	“citizen”	as	political	subject	(as	opposed	to	activists),	and	the	reclaiming	of	democracy	and	the	nation	state	(including	its	institutions	and	constitutional	rights)	and	appeals	to	shared	national	symbols,	history	and	memory	move	centre	stage	in	the	European	post-crisis	wave	of	contention.			
Continuities:	The	importance	of	movement	genealogies		Although	I	have	argued	for	the	current	period	to	be	seen	as	a	distinct	wave	of	contention	from	that	of	the	GJM,	there	is	also	clear	continuity	of	actors,	social	movements,	activist	networks,	master	frames,	ideological	influences	and	participatory	repertoires	of	deliberation	from	the	GJM	to	the	current	wave	(see	e.g.	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya,	this	issue;	Flesher	Fominaya,	2014a,	2015a;	Maecklelbergh,	2012;	Romanos,	2013;	Zamponi	and	Daphi,	2014;	Zamponi	and	Fernández,	this	issue	).			
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Indeed,	one	key	problem	with	thinking	in	terms	of	waves	or	cycles	is	that	the	periods	of	low	activism	or	latency	between	waves	is	often	overlooked,	yet	has	crucial	implications	for	understanding	visible	episodes	of	contention.		Baumgarten	(2016)	(Portugal),	Flesher	Fominaya	(2015)	(Spain),	and	Zamponi	and	Fernández	(2016)	(Italy,	Spain),	all	highlight	the	importance	of	periods	of	low	mobilization	in	the	development	of	cultural	practices	and	interpretive	frameworks	that	later	become	visible	during	anti-austerity	protest.	Paying	attention	to	continuities	helps	counter	the	impression	that	new	waves	of	protests	“come	from	nowhere”,	or	are	totally	new,	unprecedented	and	spontaneous.	Paying	attention	to	the	effects	of	earlier	waves	and	the	particular	nature	of	abeyance	periods	within	countries	can	also	help	explain	variation	across	cases	that	focusing	on	grievances	cannot.	The	variation	in	strength	and	type	of	mobilization	in	the	countries	most	affected	by	the	global	crisis	and	austerity	policies	show	that,	legitimate	calls	for	greater	attention	to	the	importance	of	economic	grievances	notwithstanding,	we	cannot	explain	the	timing,	emergence	or	strength	of	mobilizations	based	on	levels	of	economic	impact	of	the	crisis	or	the	nature	of	austerity	policies.		Pre-existing	local	and	national	mobilizations	and	experiences	may	explain	variation	in	the	nature,	strength	and	impact	of	mobilizations	in	ways	that,	as	indicated	above,	the	strength	of	direct	effects	of	crisis	cannot	(Flesher	Fominaya	2014a,	2015a,	Kannellopoulos	et.	al,	this	issue,	Zamponi	and	Fernández,	this	issue).		The	ability	of	activists	to	generate	and	sustain	the	occupations	is	affected	strongly	by	pre-existing	social	movement	networks	that	have	the	resources	
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(material,	human,	cultural	and	ideological)	to	take	advantage	of	the	national	and	transnational	socio-political-economic	opportunity	structures	provided	by	the	post-crisis	scenario,	including	mobilizations	elsewhere.	These	findings	require	a	critical	re-examination	of	“spontaneity	theses”	across	cases.			In	Italy,	Spain,	Greece,	Ireland,	and	Portugal,	precursor	movements	(or	their	absence)	made	an	important	difference	to	mobilization	forms,	repertoires,	alliances	and	resources	mobilized,	and	what	happened	once	the	occupations	were	over.	As	Zamponi	and	Fernández	(this	issue)	show,	student	movements	in	Italy	and	Spain	played	key	roles	in	influencing	the	respective	anti-austerity	mobilizations	and	discourse	in	those	countries,	transforming	“the	anti-neoliberal	discourse”	of	the	GJM	into	“an	anti-austerity	discourse”.	In	Europe,	the	movements	of	the	squares	were	often	initially	youth-led	(later	encompassing	wider	sectors	of	the	population).	Not	only	were	youth	mobilizing	around	their	precariousness	in	the	face	of	austerity	cuts	to	education,	housing	and	soaring	youth	unemployment,	post-crisis,	they	had	already	effectively	mobilized	around	precariousness	during	and	since	the	GJM,	introducing	the	concept	and	issue	of	labour	precariousness	into	dominant	and	institutionalized	discourse	(della	Porta,	2015;	Flesher	Fominaya,	2014a;	Mattoni,	2016;	Zamponi,	2012).	Those	discursive	resources	and	organizational	practices	then	prepared	the	ground	for	the	renewed	protests	in	the	wake	of	the	crisis.	Attention	to	discursive	and	cultural	processes	helps	us	illuminate	how	grievances	are	transformed,	articulated	and	mobilized.	Cultural	repertoires	from	the	GJM	were	mobilized	across	different	European	anti-austerity	
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mobilizations,	from	the	more	institutional	left	approaches	adopted	in	the	transnational	critical	Europeanist	protests	to	the	more	pre-figurative	methods	used	in	the	movements	of	the	squares	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2015a;	Maeckelbergh,2012;	Zamponi	and	Daphi,	2014).			Whether	or	not	activists	could	draw	on	established	movement	cultures,	networks	and	repertoires	also	influenced	their	ability	to	adopt	the	occupy	style	tactics	effectively.	While	the	tactic	itself	is	easily	replicated	(hence	its	quick	diffusion	around	the	world),	once	occupied,	some	camps	struggled	with	horizontal	assembly	style	decision	making,	a	process	that	requires	strong	protocols,	reflexivity	and	experience	to	work	effectively	and	to	guard	against	power	imbalances,	unsatisfactory	decision	making	and	other	associated	potential	problems.	My	comparative	research	on	Spain	and	Irelandiii	suggests	that	the	presence	of	experienced	activists	was	crucial.	Hence	activists	in	Madrid	and	Barcelona	drew	on	long-standing	autonomous	practices	in	and	beyond	the	GJM,	to	organize	their	assemblies	(with	facilitators,	moderators,	rules	of	engagement,	etc.)	whereas	activists	in	Dublin	struggled	to	establish	shared	codes	of	practice	that	could	integrate	participants	effectively.		In	the	absence	of	a	strong	core	of	experienced	activists	integrated	into	a	shared	network	they	faced	more	difficulties	in	their	ability	to	implement	horizontal	assembly	practices.			Pre-existing	networks	and	urban	spaces	of	resistance	also	made	a	difference	in	what	happened	after	the	camps	were	lifted.	If	Madrid’s	“Indignados”	could	take	the	decision	to	“go	back	to	the	neighborhoods”	it	was	because	they	had	somewhere	to	go	(e.g.	
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squatted	social	centres,	neighbourhood	association	locales),	activists	in	Dublin	hoping	to	continue	to	build	on	the	connection	made	in	Occupy	Dame	Street	struggled	with	a	dearth	of	available	meeting	spaces	(and	their	occupation	dwindled	until	it	was	unsustainable).			The	implications	of	this	for	social	movement	scholarship	is	that	we	need	to	pay	more	attention	to	movement	genealogies,	including	the	configuration,	spaces	and	resources	of	pre-existing	networks,	and	to	the	role	of	movement	cultures	and	discursive	processes	in	mobilization,	avoiding	the	myopia	of	the	present	and	the	myopia	of	the	visible	that	Melucci	(1994)	alerted	us	to	(see	also	Flesher	Fominaya,	2015a).	At	the	same	time,	we	should	not	ignore	the	importance	of	political	and	economic	contextual	factors,	including	grievances,	in	shaping	anti-austerity	resistance	(Císař		and	Navrátil,	this	issue).	Crucial	too	are	the	interpretive	systems	of	meaning	that	motivate	collective	action.	As	I	argued	above,	for	movements	with	a	counter-hegemonic	orientation,	democracy	was	a	central	interpretive	framework	for	anti-austerity	protest,	manifested	most	emblematically	in	“the	movements	of	the	squares”.	I	turn	to	this	now.	
	
III.	Democracy	Central	
Democracy	as	interpretive	framework	for	austerity	Political-economic	context	and	pre-existing	movement	resources	provide	important	tools	for	understanding	episodes	of	mobilization	in	national	contexts.	But	it	is	also	crucial	to	understand	that	interpretive	systems	of	meaning	that	motivate	collective	social	action,	while	in	many	ways	rooted	in	national	political	cultures,	can	 Deleted: and	interpretive	schema,	
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and	do	cross	national	boundaries.		Demands	for	greater	democracy	form	a	central	shared	theme	across	a	wide	range	of	protest	sites	and	forms	of	protest	(Dekker	and	Feenstra,	2015),	within	and	beyond	Europe.	Drawing	on	research	conducted	by	seven	field	teams	in	Germany,	Italy,	Spain,	Hungary,	London	and	two	Trans-European	teams,	Kaldor	and	Selchow,	(2013,	p.78	)	show	that	what	they	call	“subterranean	actors”iv	across	countries	“perceive	the	crisis	as	a	political	crisis	rather	than	a	reaction	to	austerity.	[This]		is	just	as	much	a	characteristic	of	Germany,	where	there	are	few	austerity	policies,	as	other	countries.”	The	resonance	of	the	mobilizations	across	mainstream	public	opinion	was	striking.		Their	strongest	finding	is	that	extensive	frustration	and	deep	disappointment	with	current	politics	is	what	connects	different	types	of	protests,	actions,	campaigns	and	initiatives,	despite	little	connection	between	cases.	The	second	key	finding	was	a	shared	deep	concern	with	democracy	and	the	need	for	its	collective	re-imagining,	and	from	all	the	case	studies	the	centrality	of	“the	subjective	experience	of	participating	in	politics	in	a	new	way”	(2013,	p.88).	The	strong	connection	between	activists’	anti-austerity	and	critical	pro-democracy	interpretive	frames		has	been	highlighted	in	numerous	other	studies	(Benski	et.	al,	2013;	Flesher	Fominaya,	2015a,	2016;	Glasius	and	Pleyers,	2013;	Oikonomakis	and	Roos,	2016;	Powell,	2015;	Sotirakopoulos	and	Sotiropoulos,	2013).		The	extent	to	which	strong	connections	were	made	between	the	erosion	of	democracy	and	austerity,	and	to	which	that	was	effectively	mobilized	to	resonate	among	the	population	might	help	explain	variations	in	anti-austerity	responses	across	different	national	
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contexts.	Císař	and	Navrátil	(this	issue)	find	that	in	the	Czech	Republic,	for	example,	the	“western	based	quest	of	anti-austerity	movements	for	an	alternative	democracy”	was	not	found	beyond	a	moderate	call	for	greater	transparency	and	minimizing	the	scope	for	corruption	in	the	outsourcing	of	public	services.	Nor	was	a	deep	critique	of	neoliberalism	present.	Nevertheless,	fixing	the	malfunctioning	state	was	a	central	demand.		My	researchv	shows	that	in	Spain,	“democracy”	forms	an	overarching	master	frame	that	connects	diverse	anti-austerity	actors	across	issues	and	organizational	forms,	whereas	in	Ireland,	where	there	was	a	much	weaker	collective	resistance	to	austerity,	although	there	are	critiques	of	a	democratic	deficit	from	some	actors,	no	such	overarching	narrative	can	be	found.	This	might	suggest	that	a	shared	master	narrative	about	democracy	(as	a	system/idea)	and	not	simply	levels	of	economic	grievances	or	hardship	or	a	shared	rejection	of	austerity	policies	(as	a	set	of	specific	issues)	help	explain	differences	in	levels	of	mobilization	(although	not	independently	of	other	explanatory	factors).		As	Stavrides	(in	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya,	this	issue)	argues,	what	connects	these	events	across	cases	is	that	they	“were	open	manifestations	of	a	growing	de-legitimization	of	the	corresponding	regimes”.	This	de-legitimization	spurred	the	confrontation	of	direct	or	participatory	and	representative	models	of	democracy,	a	contest	that	emerged	even	when	initiated	in	the	context	of	strongly	material	issues,	such	as	the	housing	crisis	in	Spain	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2015b).	In	the	task	of	developing	and	disseminating	a	strong	narrative	that	tied	austerity	
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policies	to	democratic	deficits	the	occupation	camps-fuelled	by	autonomous	rather	than	institutional	left	actors-played	a	central	role.		
	
The	Occupations	of	the	Squares:	Democracy	in	Acampada	Solvi	Within	the	wide	range	of	anti-austerity	protests	across	Europe,	the	camps	or	“occupations”	were	crucial	mechanisms	of	the	development	and	diffusion	of	a	counterhegemonic	narrative	of	the	crisis.	Narratives	are	a	common	set	of	stories	told	in	the	public	sphere	around	a	common	conceptual	framework	(Polletta,	2006).	If	in	the	“post-political”	sphere	alternative	and	dissenting	visions	of	society	remain	hidden,	in	the	movements	of	the	squares	they	become	visible	and	open	to	new	actors	and	new	influences.	If	in	the	post-political	realm	the	retrenchment	of	representative	democracy	in	the	liberal	state	is	built	around	consensus	and	a	lack	of	critical	alternatives	that	is	deeply	de-politicizing,	the	camps	serve	to	provide	a	public	space	of	re-politicization.	Through	their	inclusive	and	elastic	entry	requirements	(anyone	can	be	in	the	square),	camps	enabled	people	without	an	overarching	interpretive	framework	of	the	crisis,	austerity	or	democracy	to	be	integrated	into	a	collective	process	of	re-imagining	and	critique.			
	Acampada	Sol,	arguably	the	most	influential	square	in	Europe,	provides	an	illustrative	example	of	how	the	central	conceptual	framework	of	democracy	manifested	through	the	diverse	aspects	of	the	camp.	Although	an	exemplary	case,	in	terms	of	its	influence,	strength,	and	the	central	coherence	of	democracy	as	an	interpretive	framework,	Acampada	Sol	illustrates	important	features	manifested	in	camps	elsewhere.	Commencing	in	Madrid	the	night/morning	
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following	the	original	15-M	(15	May,	2011)	protest	for	“Real	Democracy	Now!”	the	camp	remained	in	Madrid’s	central	Puerta	del	Sol	for	28	days,	surviving	eviction	attempts,	and	finally	taking	the	collective	decision	to	“decamp”	with	slogans	such	as	“We	are	not	leaving,	we	are	expanding”	and	“We	are	moving	to	your	consciousness”.		The	critique	of	really	existing	democracy	and	the	development	of	alternative	democratic	imaginaries	manifested	in	Acampada	Sol	in	seven	key	ways,	serving	as	a	heterotopic	crucible	for	the	emergence	and	development	of	what	became	the	15-M	movement.			First,	in	the	face	of	increased	unemployment	and	social	inequalities,	and	a	rigid	bureaucratic	regime	unresponsive	to	the	needs	of	the	people,	activists	expanded	the	frame	and	scope	of	who	could	be	an	agent	of	change,	identifying	themselves	and	appealing	to	others	as	“citizens”	and	“ordinary	people”	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2015a).			Second,	the	central	demand	of	the	camp	echoed	the	original	15-M	protest	call	for	“Real	Democracy	now!”.	During	the	camp	over	15,000	proposals	to	improve	democracy	were	gathered.	In	the	face	of	a	devastating	crisis,	the	camp	allowed	many	people	to	shift	from	a	feeling	of	“what	can	I	do?”	despair	to	a	feeling	of	“what	can	we	do?”	hope	and	indignation.		Third,	the	camp	was	laboratory	of	civil	disobedience,	which,	in	an	electoral	context,	directly	engaged	with	existing	mechanisms	of	representation,	and	agents	of	the	state.	The	day	before	the	elections	in	Spain	is	called	the	“day	of	reflection”	during	which	campaign	
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activity	is	suspended.	Despite	not	campaigning	for	any	party,	the	camp	was	ordered	to	be	evicted,	but	the	general	assembly	decided	to	deliberately	violate	the	day	of	reflexion	prohibition	with	a	“grito	
mudo”	(a	silent	scream	where	all	those	gathered	raised	their	hands	in	silence	for	a	minute),	contesting	the	idea	that	political	participation	meant	voting	every	four	years.	This	ultimately	forced	political	elites	who	initially	tried	to	simply	ignore	the	protests	to	engage	with	the	challenges	to	their	legitimacy.	Mass	actions	of	civil	disobedience	also	forged	strong	solidarity	between	activists,	an	emerging	collective	identity	as	a	new	political	subject	(what	would	later	be	known	as	“15-M”),	and	the	strong	emotional	impact	that	many	participants	recall	years	later	(e.g.	“I	had	goose-bumps”,	“It	felt	euphoric,	like	anything	was	possible”).	Fourth,	the	camp	pre-figuratively	experimented	with	participatory	processes	organized	around	a	commitment	to	non-	hierarchy	(horizontalism)	and	inclusivity	and	the	creation	of	a	res	publica.	Prefigurative	action	reflecting	this	desire	to	rethink	and	re-imagine	democracy.	characterized	occupied	squares	in	other	sites	too,		through	debate	over	the	meaning	of	democracy	and	experimentation	with	new	forms	of	life	in	common,	unmediated	by	institutions	(see	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya,	this	issue).			Fifth,	Acampada	Sol	and	other	occupied	squares,	brought	people	who	would	not	ordinarily	engage	with	each	other	in	urban	settings,	across	age,	class,	and	ethnic	divides,	defying	social	conventions	and	providing	a	new	model	for	civil-social	interaction.				
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Sixth,	democracy	was	not	limited	to	the	rational	discursive	sphere	(in	the	Habermasian	sense)	of	the	general	assemblies.	The	need	to	organize	the	material	aspects	of	the	camp’s	life	in	common	provided	numerous	opportunities	to	politicize	the	normally	mundane,	from	rethinking	child	care	and	feeding	people	(e.g.	bringing	feminist	and	environmental	issues	to	the	fore),	to	addressing	interactions	with	police	(e.g.	stimulating	a	rethinking	of	the	state’s	legitimate	use	of	violence).	If	austerity	policies	neglect	people’s	material	needs,	placing	capital	before	life,	as	some	activists	have	so	succintly	put	it,	the	camp	inverted	that	formula,	putting	life	before	capital.	The	camp	provided	a	model	for	meeting	people’s	material	needs	in	a	way	that	respects	them,	engages	them,	and	empowers	them,	drawing	on	feminism	and	on	autonomous,	pro-commons,	DiY	and	anti-charity	/anti-assistance-based	models	(asistencialismo).			Finally	and	crucially,	Acampada	Sol	brought	diverse	pre-existing	networks	of	activists	together	around	a	shared	“problematic”	of	democracy,	allowing	them	to	allowed	them	to	cross-contaminate	through	synergy,	reciprocity	and	contestation,	lending	specific	substantive	content	to	the	“new”	democratic	imaginary.	As	Tejerina	and	Perugorría	(2012,	p.	95)	note	of	the	camp	“public	discourse...is	no	longer	inspired	by	a	stiff	and	self-contained	system	of	ideas	focusing	on	material	welfare,	but	by	an	open	and	flowing	amalgam	of	ideological	postulates	increasingly	focused	on	the	deepening	of	democracy	in	daily	life	and	everyday	practices”.		Particularly	noteworthy	are	the	reciprocal	influences	between	autonomous,	feminist,	and	hacker	ethics.	Although	each	camp	had	its	own	unique	characteristics	and	evolution,	many	of	these	characteristics	were	
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shared	across	diverse	occupation	sites	(see	e.g.	Pickerill	and	Krinsky,	2012;	and	Martín	Rojo,	2016).vii				
	
IV.	Beyond	the	national:	Transmission,	diffusion,	
contagion	and	resonance	in	the	“movements	of	the	
squares”	Although	national	contexts	are	crucial	in	explaining	variations	in	protest	across	Europe,	this	wave	is	also	characterized	by	a	high	degree	of	transnational	diffusion.		Europe	can	be	seen	as	a	space	of	contagion	for	social	movements	(Scholl,	2013).	Here	again,	the	most	emblematic,	influential	and	widespread	forms	of	“anti-austerity”	protest	in	Europe,	were	the	“movements	of	the	squares”	or	the	Occupy	style	movements.	The	centrality	of	the	demands	for	“real	democracy”	form	a	central	narrative	that	connects	not	only	the	different	movements	of	the	squares	in	Europe	but	also	connects	them	to	the	wider	global	wave	of	protest.	Yet,	as	the	example	of	Spain’s	15-M	shows,	transnational	diffusion	processes	are	circuitous,	complex,	and	reciprocal	rather	than	linear	as	transmitter-adopter	models	would	suggest.	Spain’s	15-M	movement	and	particularly	the	experiences	of	Acamapada	Sol	was	clearly	a	model	for	European	anti-austerity	movements	with	far	reaching	influence	(Accornero	and	Pinto,	2015,	Romanos,	2015).	Spain’s	15-M	itself	emerged	partly	in	response	to	the	events	in	North	Africa	and	particularly	Tahrir	square	in	early	2011,	whose	influence	was	felt	in	Europe	far	beyond	Spain	(see,	e.g.	Baumgarten	2013;		Benski	et.	al.,	2013;	Roos	and	Oikonomakis,	2015;	
This	is	a	pre-print	versión	Please	do	not	cite.	To	cite	this	paper	please	refer	to	the	published	version	available	here:	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14742837.2016.1256193	
	 28	
Formatted: English (UK)
Sergi	and	Vogiatzoglou,	2013),	but	15-M	was	also	influenced	by	Iceland’s	Saucepan	Revolution	in	2009,	Portugal’s	Geraçao	a	Rasca	protests,	and	other	transnational	events	like	Wikileaks		Despite	this	international	influence,	the	demand	for	“Real	Democracy	Now!”	was	directed	squarely	at	Spain's	national	and	political	elites.	Despite	or	perhaps	because	of	this	targeting	of	national	oligarchies,	the	language	it	developed	and	the	claims	made	for	“Real	Democracy	Now!”	found	resonance	across	Europe	and	other	parts	of	the	world.	(Accornero	and	Pinto,	2015;	Oikonomakes	and	Roos,	2016;	Sergi	and	Vogiatzoglou,	2013).		On	October	15,	2011,	“15-O”,	a	global	day	of	action	under	the	slogan	“Stop	the	cuts,	rescue	the	people”	inspired	by	15-M	brought	people	out	on	the	streets	and	squares	in	some	951	cities	across	82	countries	(della	Porta	and	Mattoni,	2014;	Tejerina	and	Pergurría,	2012).		Spain's	15-M	movement	along	with	activists	from	the	Greek	“Aganaktismenoi”	or	Indignados	viii	movement	later	played	a	key	role	in	shaping	the	protests	of	Occupy	Wall	Street	(Kroll,	2011;	Lawrence,	2012;	Romanos,	2015).	But	the	OWS	protests	too	drew	strongly	on	local	and	national	political	movement	traditions,	and	US	political	cultural	narratives,	leading	to	the	“We	are	the	99%”	formulation	that	then	made	its	way	back	to	Europe	and	other	countries	around	the	world.ix	These	routes	and	the	influence	of	MENA	and	European	formulations	and	experiences	are	sometimes	forgotten,	and	a	certain	privileging	of	Occupy	Wall	Street	(OWS)	emerges,	such	as	in	Pickerill	and	Krinsky’s	(2012,	p.	284)	early	(and	problematic)	claims	that:	Certain	choices	and	tactics	and	strategies	are	deeply	rooted	in	
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the	Anglo	activist	approach	and	some	of	this	did	not	easily	translate	to	other	countries,	such	as	Italy…	Depending	on	one's	starting	point	Occupy	can	be	perceived	as	a	global	movement	(inspired	by	the	Arab	spring)	or	as	a	North	American	concept	which	was	copied	across	Europe	(particularly	in	Britain).			These	claims	overlook	the	chronological	order	of	the	protest	events	as	well	as	the	transnational	dimensions	of	contagion	between	sites,	less	documented	at	their	time	of	writing.	As	Zamponi	and	Fernández	(this	issue)	show,	OWS	was	not	a	major	point	of	reference	in	Italy	relative	to	other	movements,	and	certainly	OWS	was	strongly	influenced	by	Egypt,	Spain	and	Greece	(Kroll,	2011;	Lawrence,	2012;	Romanos,	2015).	OWS	in	turn	had	an	important	influence	on	the	rest	of	European	mobilizations,	but	primarily	in	contexts	that	took	the	US	as	an	important	social	movement	referent,	such	as	the	UK	and	Ireland,	for	both	linguistic	reasons	as	well	as	reciprocity	between	movement	communities	in	these	countriesx.		Circuitous	too	was	the	transmission	between	Portugal's	Geraçao	a	
Rasca,	which	predated	and	also	influenced	Spain’s	15-M,	but	then	was	remobilized	and	influenced	by	the	latter	movement’s	strong	emergence	onto	the	national	and	world	stage	(Accornero	and	Pinto,	2015;	Baumgarten,	2013).	Greece	had	already	been	experiencing	more	“traditional”	forms	of	mobilization	from	April	2010	to	April	2011	prior	to	the	emergence	of	15-M,	including	general	strikes,	clashes	with	police	and	protests	throughout	Greek	cities.	The	shift	to	the	“Indignados”	occupy-style	movement	came	from	the	influence	of	Arab	Spring	and	Spain’s	15-M	(Sergi	and	Vogiatzoglou,	2013).		
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Meanwhile	Ireland,	despite	assuming	a	65	Billion	Euro	Debt	to	bail	out	the	banks,	and	their	own	Occupy	experience	in	Dublin	and	other	cities,	failed	to	generate	a	sustained	or	mass	resistance	to	austerity.	While	Ireland	later	experienced	mass	mobilizations	around	the	“Right	to	Water”,	the	claims	and	demands	of	this	movement	differ	markedly	from	the	broader	demands	for	democratic	regeneration	and	an	end	to	austerity	policies	found	in	the	earlier	Occupy	movements	around	Europe	and	even	the	US	(a	closer	point	of	reference	for	Ireland	in	many	ways).		Although	there	is	clear	evidence	of	15-M	activists	acting	as	“brokers”	in	the	run-up	to	Occupy	Dame	Street	(Dublin),	the	strongest	point	of	reference	within	the	camp	appears	to	have	been	OWS,	and	not	15-M.			Although	witnessing	various	forms	of	anti-austerity	protest,	including	numerous	strikes	and	the	radical		“bossnappings”	(Parsons,	2013),	France	was	a	“sleeper	country”	in	terms	of	occupy-style	movements,	(Chabanet	and	Royall,	2015)	their	occupations	having	relatively	little	impact	until	Nuit	Debout	erupted	in	Paris	2016.	Suddenly,	just	as	activists	in	Spain	thought	they	were	hitting	a	wall	and	making	little	progress	on	many	of	their	original	demands	for	democratic	regeneration,	they	found	Parisian	activists	singing	them	Happy	Birthday	on	the	5th	anniversary	of	15-M	(eldiario.es,	2016a),	and	making	reference	to	their	movement	as	an	inspiration	(Bautista,	2016).	This	Parisian	experience	then	influenced	renewed	occupations	in	Spain	in	the	Basque	country,	an	area	that	had	had	very	little	mobilization	in	2011,	when	most	of	the	rest	of	the	country	was	taking	to	the	streets,	and	global	Nuit	Debout	actions	were	called	for	(Bautista,	2016).	Here	then	the	Spanish	Basque	activists	were	clearly	
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referencing	their	French	counterparts,	and	adopting	their	name,	and	
not	that	of	15-M.			This	tracing	of	Spain’s	15-M	movement’s	influence	from	and	diffusion	to	other	occupy-style	movements	shows	that	the	transmission	processes	between	movements	are	very	difficult	to	predict	and	do	not	follow	a	linear	chronological	pattern	from	one	country	to	the	next	but	are	made	up	of	complex	reciprocal	flows.		Transmission	took	place	directly	and	indirectly,	sometimes	face-to-face,	sometimes	mediated	in	myriad	ways.	Activists	in	Dublin	told	me	how	they	watched	OWS	live-streams	to	get	a	better	sense	of	how	to	go	about	their	own	assemblies,	a	sort	of	remote	learning	facilitated	by	the	digital	technology	practices	that	helped	disseminate	movement	practices	and	frames	from	one	context	to	the	other.	As	is	clear	from	the	testimonies	of	activists	in	Turkey,	Portugal,	Spain,	Greece,	Egypt	and	the	US	in	the	roundtable	discussion	on	“Life	After	the	Squares”	in	this	issue	“almost	all	cases	occupied	squares	referred	to	each	other	and	recognized	shared	characteristics”	(Stavrides	in	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya,	this	issue).	As	Oikonomakis	and	Roos	(2016)	argue	we	need	to	dispense	with	linear	understandings	of	diffusion	and	instead	recognize	the	complexity	of	patterns	of	“resonance”	between	protest	movements.			
V.	Consequences		Koopmans	(2004)	and	Tarrow	(1998)	argue	that	repression	and	institutionalization	are	two	common	outcomes	of	waves	of	protest	that	also	contribute	to	“contraction”	or	a	decrease	in	mobilization	(along	with	other	factors,	such	as	protest	fatigue).	Within	Europe	we	
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have	seen	evidence	of	these	effects	in	some	cases.	In	Spain,	the	strong	challenge	to	“democracy	as	usual”	is	revealed	in	the	two	most	visible	and	unintended	consequences	of	the	mobilizations:	the	legal	reforms	enacted	in	the	wake	of	the	protests	to	restrict	the	right	to	protest,	and	the	institutionalization	of	the	movements	in	the	form	of	new	hybrid-parties,	such	as	Podemos	and	the	municipal	movements.	Although	an	exemplary	case,	the	consequences	in	the	Spanish	case	offer	insights	into	processes	also	underway	elsewhere.		
	
Legal	repression	and	the	silencing	of	dissent	Strength	of	mobilization	did	not	have	a	direct	effect	on	receptivity	to	citizen	demands	from	political	elites,	but	did	prompt	an	unintended	consequence	in	the	form	of	increased	repression	and	an	alarming	closing	of	political	space	for	dissent,	a	trend	that	has	spread	across	Europe,	facilitated	discursively	in	some	cases,	such	as	France	and	Belgium,	by	terrorist	attacks	that	provide	an	excuse	to	also	shut	down	peaceful	and	legitimate	forms	of	protest	and	resistance.	From	the	gag	law	in	Spain	to	the	suspension	of	anti-climate	change	protests	in	France,	to	the	curtailing	of	internet	freedom	and	freedom	of	expression	in	Turkey,	governments	across	Europe	are	tailoring	their	legislation	to	silence	dissent	(Çigdem	in	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya,	this	issue;	Freedom	House,	2016a	and	b)	.			Spain’s	reform	of	the	penal	code	and	the	Law	for	the	Protection	of	Citizen	Security,	known	as	the	“Gag	Law”	(Ley	Mordaza)	was	a	clear	response	to	anti-austerity	and	pro-democracy	protest.	The	clear	causal	link	between	the	high	levels	of	citizen	mobilization	and	the	
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new	legal	restrictions	has	been	made	by	International	Organizations,	including	the	UN	Human	Rights	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	(2015).	One	such	tactic	is	the	increasing	use	of	fines	to	punish	and	dissuade	peaceful	protest.	Under	the	existing	Law	for	the	Protection	
of	Citizen	Security	(1992),	fines	range	from	€100	to	€1001	for	lesser	infractions	and	up	to	€600,000	for	very	serious	infractions.		Refusing	to	dissolve	a	protest,	for	example,	is	a	‘serious	infraction’	(Amnesty	International,	2014).	The	use	of	administrative	fines	is	increasing,	and	in	a	recent	report,	the	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	for	the	Council	of	Europe	(2013,	p.18)	expressed	concern,	considering	it	to	constitute	a	violation	of	freedom	of	expression	and	association.		Clearly	the	possibility	of	incurring	huge	and	disproportionate	fines	is	intended	to	dissuade	protest	and	silence	the	voices	of	citizens	outraged	by,	the	privatization	of	public	services,	the	imposition	of	punitive	austerity	measures	and	corruption	scandals,	among	other	grievances.			Amnesty	International	(2014,	p.24)	points	out	that	this	generates	a	“grotesque	situation”	where	those	most	affected	by	the	crisis	are	unable	to	exercise	their	democratic	right	to	protest	due	to	the	inability	to	pay	the	fines	they	will	get	for	doing	so.	Legal	Sol,	who	offer	support	to	15-M	activists	in	Madrid,	registered	1,010	fines	totalling	over	320,000	Euros	between	May	2011	and	November	2013.	However,	the	increased	and	often	arbitrary	application	of	existing	law	was	not	sufficiently	restrictive,	according	to	the	Popular	Party	(Amnesty	International,	2014),	hence	the	reform	of	the	penal	code	and	modification	of	the	Law	of	Protection	of	Citizen	Security	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2014b).	These	legal	reforms	in	Spain	are	also	a	
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response	to	activists	who	have	taken	on	cases	of	high	level	fraud	and	corruption	(such	as	15mpaRato),	and	go	hand-in-hand	with	other	mechanisms	of	counter-resistance	such	as	the	political	use	of	the	judiciary	system,	another	crucial	area	of	concern	(e.g,	see	Escolar,	2016)	as	well	as	political	manipulation	of	public	news	broadcasting	(Eldiario.es,	2016b).		Members	of	the	Platform	for	those	Affected	by	Mortgages	(PAH),	who	protest,	inter	alia,	at	having	to	keep	paying	their	mortgage	debt,	despite	losing	their	homes	to	foreclosure,	have	accumulated	tens	of	thousands	of	Euros	in	fines	(PAH,	2016)	and	journalists	documented	40.000	fines	to	members	of	the	press	in	seven	months	alone	in	2015	(Reporteros	sin	Fronteras,	2016).	There	are	numerous	cases	of	imprisonment	for	protests	and	on-going	trials	(too	numerous	to	list	here,	but	see	Legal	Sol’s	website	https://legal15m.wordpress.com/).		Legal	restrictions	and	criminal	and	civic	costs	associated	with	peaceful	protest,	therefore,	form	a	crucial	part	of	political	opportunity	structures,	as	we	would	expect.	But	what	we	also	see	is	that	mass	mobilization	also	has	increased	restrictions	as	an	unintended	consequence	of	pro-democracy	mobilization,	leading	to	
fewer	rather	than	greater	democratic	rights.			Given	the	key	role	of	the	internet	and	digital	media	in	disseminating	counter-hegemonic	narratives	and	as	an	organizing	platform	for	protest,	it	is	no	wonder	that	internet	freedoms	are	also	being	curtailed	and	online	expression	is	being	criminalized.	As	with	resisting	Gag	Laws	and	other	threats	to	freedom	of	protest	and	expression,	resisting	curtailments	to	democratic	freedoms	online	
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depends	on	the	existence	of	a	motivated	network	of	collective	actors	who	actively	advocate	for	the	political	use	of	the	internet	and	establish	channels	for	effective	political	communication	online.	These	include	encrypted	whistleblowing	facilities	that	connect	journalists,	lawyers	and	whistleblowers	(such	as	Wikileaks,	or	Spain’s	Fíltrala	or	BuzónX);	critical	alternative	news	outlets	that	inspire	confidence	through	journalistic	rigour	and	reputation;	and	effective	social	movement	and	citizen	journalism	networks.	
	
Reconfiguration	of	the	political	landscape	These	mobilizations	have	also	had	an	impact	on	the	electoral	sphere,	again	to	greatly	different	degrees:	in	Spain,	the	movement	has	reconfigured	the	political	landscape,	and	led	to	the	creation	of	new	parties	such	as	Podemos	and	new	municipal	platforms,	putting	an	end	to	bi-partisan	alternating	of	power	(Atentas,	2016).		In	Greece,	a	pre-existing	party	(Syriza)	initially	sceptical	of	the	participants	in	Syntagma,	benefitted	from	the	increased	mobilizations	to	become	the	governing	party	(see	Kannellopoulos	et.	al.,	this	issue;	and	Stavrides	in	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya,	this	issue).	In	both	cases,	their	relation	to	grassroots	movements	has	been	problematic	and	contested	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2014c;	Stavrides	in	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya,	this	issue).			Iceland	has	had	a	remarkable	series	of	changes	since	their	Saucepan	Revolution,	first	ousting	the	austerity	government	responsible	for	the	country’s	bankruptcy	only	to	vote	them	in	again	a	short	time	later,	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2014a)	with	the	direct/liquid	democracy	Pirate	Party’s	support	jumping	in	the	wake	of	the	Panama	Paper	scandals	
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(Electograph,	2016)	but	not	yet	converting	public	support	to	strong	parliamentary	representationxi.	Other	countries	hoping	to	convert	popular	protest	into	strong	electoral	options	have	been	less	successful,	although	Italy’s	5	Stelle	movement	managed	to	effectively	channel	public	sentiment	even	in	the	absence	of	a	strong	grassroots	movement	base,	winning	important	electoral	victories	(Mosca,	2014).	In	other	cases,	the	movements	did	not	lead	to	the	creation	of	new	parties	but	did	galvanize	popular	support	for	leaders	with	an	anti-austerity	agenda:	UK	Labour’s	Jeremy	Corbyn	(and	indeed	the	Bernie	Sanders	campaign	in	the	US)	cannot	be	understood	without	factoring	in	the	influence	of	the	occupy	movements.			Anti-austerity	political	representation	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	an	overturning	of	austerity	policies.	Despite	strong	mobilization	in	Greece	and	a	nation	overwhelmingly	in	favour	of	rejecting	the	Troika’s	dictates,	the	Greek	government	despite	initial	resistance,	ultimately	gave	in	to	the	Troika’s	demands	in	a	negotiation	where	the	power	imbalance	between	players	was	great.	Today	Greece’s	Syriza	government	is	“absolutely	following	the	policies	it	condemned	before	it	came	to	power…the	official	rhetoric	is	following	the	good	old	tactics	of	giving	new	names	to	old	policies	and	of	disguising	brutal	neoliberalism	as	opportunities	for	development	and	economic	growth”	(Stavrides	in	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya,	this	issue).		In	addition	to	national	hybrid	parties,	we	are	seeing	movement-based	political	initiatives	take	over	local	administrations	in	Spain	and	Italy,	calls	for	increased	democratic	participation	at	all	levels	of	
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government,	and	initiatives	such	as	Plan	B,	calling	for	greater	transnational	coordination	across	national	movement	networks	in	the	face	of	the	impossibility	of	individual	states	confronting	the	European	Union	and	the	Troika	on	their	own	(Plan	B,	2016)xii.			
	
Counter-hegemony	The	greatest	impact	of	anti-austerity	resistance	in	the	public	sphere	has	been	the	challenge	to	until	recently	hegemonic	narratives	that	justified	the	crisis	and	the	neoliberal	order.	One	of	the	crucial	features	of	Spain’s	15-M	discourse	was	the	framing	of	a	collective	identity	(a	“we”)	that	was	elastic,	ambiguous,	open,	and	inclusive,	constituted	around	notions	of	“we	the	people”	and	ordinary	citizens	(Errejón,	2015;	Flesher	Fominaya,	2015a;	Tejerina	and	Perrugoría,	2012).	It	is	this	aspect	of	the	movement’s	discourse	that	has	led	it	to	be	characterized	(often	pejoratively)	as	“populist”.		In	contrast	to	“thick”	populism	(Jagers	and	Walgrave,	2007),	however,	it	is	not	exclusionary.	In	addition,	the	movement	played	a	crucial	role	in	defining	the	“them”	against	which	they	mobilized,	framed	as	an	unholy	alliance	of	political	and	economic	elites	that	abused	their	power	for	self-interest	and	against	the	direct	interest	of	the	people,	and	adding	insult	to	injury,	passing	on	the	cost	of	their	“crisis/swindle”	to	hardworking	people.	The	movement’s	counter-hegemonic	(or	“anti-systemic”	if	we	adopt	the	terminology	used	by	political	elites)	discourse	unleashed	a	public	struggle	over	the	meaning	of	“legitimate	democracy”	(Flesher	Fominaya,	2015b).		
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This	us	versus	them	framing	was	by	no	means	unique	to	Spain,	and	was	most	effectively	encapsulated	in	the	widely	circulated	OWS	slogan	“we	are	the	99%”.	Effective	as	it	is,	the	narrative	of	the	99%	against	the	1%,	also	brings	it	own	problems,	not	least	a	failure	to	recognize	the	myriad	ways	power,	discrimination	and	injustice	traverse	that	99%	in	the	form	of	sexism,	racism	and	classism	(Calvo	and	López	2015;	Flesher	Fominaya,	2015c).	In	Spain,	strong	feminist	influences	and	a	strong	focus	on	the	human,	material,	consequences	of	austerity	have	been	partially	successful	in	counteracting	the	worst	potential	consequences	of	this	blind	spot.	Despite	these	limitations,	15-M	and	other	anti-austerity	movements	were	successful	in	contesting	hegemonic	narratives	that	defined	the	crisis	as	unavoidable	or	the	effect	of	abstract	economic	forces	outwith	human	control,	and	austerity	policies	as	the	inevitable	result	of	these	same	processesxiii.	These	counter-narratives	were	mobilized	in	multiple	ways	and	disseminated	through	complex	media	on/offline	networks.	Crucially,	in	the	face	of	widespread	human	misery,	fear	and	a	declining	confidence	in	representative	democracy,	these	mobilizations	offered	an	often	joyful	possibility	that	change	was	possible.		As	Stavrides	(in	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya,	this	issue)	argues:			Delegitimization	of	power,	demythologizing	of	state	violence	and	the	revelation	of	injustices	did	not	result	in	the	paralyzing	view	that	nothing	can	be	done,	that	politics	stinks,	that	the	powerful	are	invincible.	Squares	produced	real	tangible	alternatives	both	to	politics,	to	the	everyday	survival	tactics	and	to	the	existing	forms	of	social	organization.	And	those	
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alternatives	are	bound	to	greet	new	eruptions	of	collective	inventive	resistance.		
	
	
Beyond	“politics”	But	impacts	cannot	and	should	not	be	measured	solely	in	such	narrow	political	terms.	As	the	roundtable	curated	by	Fernández-Savater	and	Flesher	Fominaya	in	this	issue	shows,	the	occupation	experiences	have	had	lasting	impacts	wherever	they	have	emerged,	independently	of	the	“success”	or	“failure”	of	the	mobilizations.		We	should	expand	our	intellectual	curiosity	beyond	the	State	to	explore	the	impacts	of	these	occupations	on	movement	networks,	cultural	and	artistic	developments,	the	emotions	and	relationships	of	the	participants,	the	emergence	of	new	forms	of	media,	and	non-movement	specific	initiatives	inspired	by	the	protest	experiences	such	as	civil	society	organizations	and	economic	initiatives.			We	also	need	to	recognize	that	perhaps	the	most	important	forms	of	anti-austerity	resistance	are	not	to	be	found	in	mobilizations	at	all,	but	in	new	forms	of	“survival	tactics”	and	social	organization	based	on	solidarity	and	collective	self-empowerment,	such	as	neighbourhood	food	banks,	solidarity	economy	initiatives,	alternative	currency	networks,	political	experimentation,	new	alternative	media	initiatives,	and	so	much	more.	These	initiatives,	often	inspired	by	active	involvement	in	the	movements	of	the	squares	and	other	forms	of	resistance	to	austerity,	have	potentially	
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transformative	long-term	consequences,	long	after	the	squares	are	empty.			
Conclusion:	Europe	at	a	cross-roads	The	current	wave	of	European	anti-austerity	mobilizations	shows	significant	continuities	with	the	GJM,	but	the	impact	of	the	financial	crisis	has	brought	the	nation	-state	and	the	“citizen”	as	political	subject	centre	stage.	At	the	same	time	transnational	processes	of	diffusion	were	very	influential,	but	activists	in	each	locale	drew	on	pre-existing	networks	and	resources,	including	historical	and	cultural	legacies	to	adapt	and	translate	new	demands	and	repertoires	of	action	to	their	own	setting.	Strong	transnational	diffusion	did	not	lead	to	the	creation	of	strong	transnational	organizations.	Surprisingly,	given	the	role	of	the	Troika	in	imposing	austerity	policies	(but	in	keeping	with	previous	findings),	“Europe”	is	less	visible	than	we	might	expect,	but	by	no	means	absent,	and	this	visibility	varies	across	cases.				The	countering	of	the	crisis/austerity	narrative,	itself	tied	to	an	ideological	commitment	to	the	neoliberal	state,	has,	along	with	a	deep	questioning	of	the	legitimacy	of	“really	existing	democracy”,	been	the	most	potentially	significant	characteristic	of	anti-austerity	resistance	in	Europe	in	that	provides	at	least	the	possibility	of	imagining	alternatives	to	a	status	quo	that	satisfies	few.	I	suggest	that	the	extent	to	which	activists	managed	to	combine	a	critique	of	austerity	with	a	demand	for	real	or	better	democracy,	they	have	managed	to	break	with	the	post-political	consensus	around	the	neoliberal	state	and	representative	democracy.	This	rupture	has	been	most	visible	in	the	movements	of	the	squares	but	is	not	limited	
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to	them.	The	influence	of	the	ideas	mobilized	in	the	squares	has	spilled	over	to	many	other	forms	of	collective	resistance.	The	challenge	to	the	legitimacy	of	really	existing	democracy	has	produced	the	most	visible	consequences	of	anti-austerity	protest:	although	austerity	policies	are	still	firmly	in	place,	the	political	landscape	has	been	transformed,	discursively,	in	the	form	of	new	institutional	actors	(new	or	renewed	parties),	and	also	mechanisms	of	counter	resistance	from	the	state	(e.g.	Gag	Laws,	attacks	of	freedom	of	press,	expression,	assembly),	leading	to	a	decrease	rather	than	an	increase	in	certain	rights	and	freedoms.	The	inability	of	individual	states	to	stand	up	to	supranational	constellations	of	power	such	as	the	Troika,	made	evident	by	the	case	of	Greece,	has	revealed	the	limitations	of	national	frameworks	of	resistance	to	supranational	systems	of	power,	and	led	to	calls	for	a	renewed	effort	to	organize	transnationally,	such	as	Plan	B	and	efforts	at	transnational	critical	Europeanism	(Plan	B,	2016;	Chatzopoulou	and	Bourne,	2016).			Europe	faces	a	crisis	of	legitimacy	as	never	before,	whether	manifest	in	the	withdrawal	from	the	EU	of	Brexit,	whose	debates	were	fuelled	by	racist,	anti-immigrant	fear-mongering;	the	mass	outcry	against	the	shameful	treatment	of	refugees	arriving	(if	they	are	lucky	enough	to	survive	the	journey)	at	European	shores	that	highlighted	the	distance	between	European	leaders	and	citizens,	and	the	inability	of	“Europe”	to	act	as	one	politically;	or	the	plummeting	levels	of	confidence	in	the	EU	and	national	political	classes.		Progressive	anti-austerity	and	pro-democracy	movements	are	but	one	possible	response	to	this	crisis	of	legitimacy,	just	as	they	are	but	one,	albeit	important,	cause	of	it.	Europe	is	at	a	cross-roads,	and	collective	resistance	is	more	
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necessary	than	ever	to	combat	the	rising	tide	of	racism	and	xenophobia,	the	relentless	attacks	on	the	social	welfare	state-	whose	provisions	can	ameliorate	the	worst	human	costs	of	austerity-	and	to	safeguard	guarantees	to	fundamental	rights	and	freedoms,	not	least	the	right	to	protest	itself.	Yet	all	waves	of	contention	subside,	subject	to	a	process	of	fatigue,	repression	and	institutionalization,	as	well	as	the	actions	of	counter-movements	that	seek	to	maintain	the	status	quo	or	retreat	to	an	imagined	idealized	past	(i.e.	“Let’s	make	[insert	nation	here]	great	again”).		Tormey	(2015)	argues	that	in	the	wake	of	the	global	wave	of	protests	“democracy	will	never	be	the	same	again”	and	that	the	crisis	of	representative	politics	has	transformed	the	nature	of	mobilization,	contestation	and	politics	itself.	I	feel	it	is	too	soon	to	tell	what	the	truly	transformative	impacts	of	these	mobilizations	will	be,	but	that	at	the	very	least	they	have	opened	a	breach	in	the	field	of	hegemonic	ideology	that	has	re-politicized	civil	society	and	is	already	producing	initiatives	for	regenerating	“really	existing	democracy”,	as	well	as	producing	strong	resistances	to	changes	to	the	status	quo.	Democracy	is	an	empty	signifier	that	anti-austerity	and	pro-democracy	activists,	like	those	in	the	GJM	before	them,	have	tried	to	re-imbue	with	specific	substantive	content.	This	process	of	re-signification	is	necessarily	long-term,	as	it	involves	breaking	down	existing	consensus	and	generating	new	ones	around	alternative	systems	of	meanings.	Studying	the	lessons	of	European	anti-austerity	mobilizations	and	tracing	their	continuing	evolution	and	consequences	will	reveal	what	the	nature	of	democratic	“renewal”	might	be.		
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